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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
“Citizen informants can provide useful information and play an 
important role in law enforcement. At the same time, however, it is 
imperative to recognize the potential for abuse if the information provided 
by a citizen informant is not reliable.”1 This statement provides context for 
the central conflict of City of Missoula v. Tye,2 in which the Montana 
Supreme Court held that fabricated information from a 911 caller was 
sufficiently reliable to establish particularized suspicion for an 
investigative stop of a suspected impaired driver.3 The Court applied a 
three-factor test previously articulated in the 1997 case of State v. Pratt4 
to assess whether the 911 caller’s report containing fabricated information 
was reliable.5 
 
II.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The Defendant, Brieana Tye (“Tye”), was charged with 
aggravated driving under the influence (“DUI”) in Missoula Municipal 
Court.6 Tye filed a motion to suppress evidence on the basis that the 
officers lacked particularized suspicion to stop her.7 The Municipal Court 
denied Tye’s motion.8 Tye then appealed the Municipal Court’s decision 
to the Fourth Judicial District Court.9 
Tye was arrested pursuant to a 911 call from a citizen informant 
who reported a possible drunk driver.10 The informant, Rami Haddad 
(“Haddad”), told the 911 dispatcher that while he was driving on Hillview 
Way, he observed a vehicle pull out in front of him and swerve across the 
road.11 Haddad reported to the dispatcher that he was unable to provide a 
physical description of the driver or the vehicle’s license plate number.12 
Haddad stated that he was willing to be contacted by law enforcement and 
                                           
1 State v. Pratt, 951 P.2d 37, 42 (Mont. 1997).  
2 372 P.3d 1286 (Mont. 2016). 
3 Id. 
4 951 P.2d 37. 





10 Id. at 1288. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
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“possibly” sign a complaint if the vehicle was located.13 Although Haddad 
provided his first name, last name, and phone number to the 911 
dispatcher, he declined to provide his residential address.14  
Officers located a vehicle matching the description provided by 
Haddad in his 911 report.15 When the officers conducted an investigative 
stop and made contact with Tye, she was standing near her parked 
vehicle.16 During their encounter with Tye, the officers observed that “she 
was swaying, had watery eyes, slow slurred speech, and smelled of 
alcohol.”17 Based on Tye’s apparent intoxication, officers arrested her.18  
The officers soon discovered that Haddad had fabricated the 
information he reported to the 911 dispatcher.19 Haddad admitted that he 
did not observe Tye driving but called 911 from his residence after Tye 
drove away from his home intoxicated.20 Haddad explained that he had 
fabricated the information he provided to 911 because he was friends with 
Tye and did not want her to know he was the complainant.21 
Tye appeared and pled not guilty to the DUI charge in Missoula 
Municipal Court.22 Tye subsequently moved to suppress all evidence 
obtained from her contact with the officers, contending that the officers 
lacked particularized suspicion to initiate an investigative stop because the 
911 report contained fabricated information and the tip was thus 
unreliable.23 The Missoula Municipal Court denied Tye’s motion to 
suppress, concluding that the officers “reasonably relied” on the 
information provided by Haddad, even though some of that information 
was fabricated.24 Tye appealed the lower court’s order to the district court, 
which affirmed the municipal court’s decision.25 Tye then appealed to the 
Montana Supreme Court.26 
Tye argued on appeal that the officers lacked particularized 
suspicion to stop her under the Pratt test.27 The Montana Supreme Court 
examined the record independently from the district court’s decision and 
affirmed the lower court’s decision under a clearly erroneous standard of 
review.28 The Court held that Haddad’s report was reliable in accordance 
















28 Id. (citing City of Missoula v. Armitage, 335 P.3d 736, 738 (Mont. 2014)). 
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with Pratt and its progeny and that it established the requisite 
particularized suspicion for the officers to stop Tye.29  
 
III.   LEGAL ANALYSIS 
 
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article II, § 11 of the Montana Constitution protect individuals against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.30 These constitutional protections also 
extend to investigative stops, which must be justified by “particularized 
suspicion.”31 In Montana, a peace officer is authorized to stop a vehicle 
when the officer has a particularized suspicion that an occupant of that 
vehicle has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.32 
Particularized suspicion includes “(1) objective data and articulable facts 
from which [a peace officer] can make certain reasonable inferences and 
(2) a resulting suspicion that the person to be stopped has committed, is 
committing, or is about to commit an offense.”33 To determine whether or 
not particularized suspicion existed at the time of the stop, a court must 
consider the totality of the circumstances, “including the quantity and 
quality of the information available to the officer at the time of the stop.”34  
When an informant’s report provides the basis for an officer’s 
particularized suspicion, the report must contain “some indicia of 
reliability.”35 In Montana, the standard for evaluating the reliability of an 
informant’s report was set forth in Pratt.36 In Pratt, the defendant 
challenged the reliability of information provided by an informant, a gas 
station employee who believed the defendant was intoxicated when he 
observed him enter the gas station and called to report him to the police.37 
The employee provided specific information regarding the defendant’s 
vehicle and the direction in which it was travelling.38 Based on the 
employee’s report, officers stopped and arrested the defendant.39 The 
Court found the employee to be a reliable informant and upheld the stop 
of the defendant as lawful, adopting a three-factor test to assess the 
reliability of an informant’s report.40  Under this test, a court must 
consider: (1) whether the informant exposed herself to criminal or civil 
liability by providing identifying information to law enforcement; (2) 
                                           
29 Id. at 1289–1292. 
30 Id. at 1289. 
31 Id. at 1289–1290 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-55-401(1) (2015)). 
32 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-401(1); State v. Gopher, 631 P.2d 293 (Mont. 1981). 
33 State v. Marcial, 308 P.3d 69, 74 (Mont. 2013) (quoting State v. Wagner, 303 P.3d 285, 288 (Mont. 
2013)). 
34 Tye, 372 P.3d at 1290 (citing City of Missoula v. Moore, 251 P.3d 679, 684 (Mont. 2011)).  
35 Moore, 251 P.3d at 684 (quoting Pratt, 951 P.2d at 42). 
36 Pratt, 952 P.2d at 42. 
37 Id. at 39. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 42. 
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whether the informant’s personal observations provide the basis for the 
informant’s report, and; (3) whether the officer’s own observations 
corroborated the informant’s observations.41  
In Tye, the Court held that Haddad was a reliable informant.42 The 
Court determined that the first and second Pratt factors were met. Haddad 
had provided his name and phone number to the 911 dispatcher, and the 
officers reasonably inferred that the informant’s detailed report was based 
on his personal observations.43 Additionally, the Court determined that the 
third Pratt factor was satisfied because officers corroborated the 
“innocent” details of the informant’s report, such as the defendant’s 
vehicle color, make, model, and location.44 
 
A.   The Pratt Factors 
 
Informant reports are both useful and important to law 
enforcement, but the Court has expressed concern about the “potential for 
abuse” that may arise from officers acting upon unreliable reports.45 
Unlike previous applications of Pratt, the Court in Tye was forced to 
wrestle with a troubling fact: Haddad, motivated by his own interests, 
fabricated his personal observations when reporting a possible DUI, and 
the officer relied on this fabricated information to conduct an investigative 
stop and ultimately an arrest. While the Court appropriately applied the 
Pratt factors in Tye, this case marks the first time the Court dealt with an 
informant whose fabricated personal observations led to a fruitful 
investigation. As a result, the Tye holding stretches the traditional Pratt 
analysis to allow an officer to reasonably rely on a fabricated 911 report, 
which seems to be the type of situation the Court cautioned against in 
Pratt. 
 
1. The First Pratt Factor 
 
In assessing an informant’s reliability, a court must first consider 
whether or not the informant identified himself to law enforcement, “and 
thus expose[d] himself to criminal and civil liability if the report is false.”46 
Information provided by an informant may form the basis for 
particularized suspicion to justify an investigative stop.47 Tye argued that 
Haddad did not satisfy the first Pratt factor because he declined to provide 
                                           
41 Tye, 372 P.3d at 1290 (citing Pratt, 951 P.2d at 42–43). 
42 Id. at 1290. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 1291 (citing Moore, 251 P.3d at 685). 
45 Pratt, 951 P.2d at 42. 
46 Tye, 372 P.3d at 1290 (citing Pratt, 951 P.2d at 42–43). 
47 Pratt, 951 P.2d at 41 (citing Boland v. State, 792 P.2d 1 (Mont. 1990); State v. Ellinger, 725 P.2d 
1201 (Mont. 1986)). 
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his residential address to the 911 dispatcher.48 However, the Court has 
“consistently held that an informant exposes himself to criminal and civil 
liability when he identifies himself to a 911 dispatcher,” which Haddad 
did by providing his name and phone number.49 While Haddad declined to 
provide his address and was hesitant to sign a complaint, he had 
sufficiently satisfied the initial Pratt factor by providing his name and 
phone number to the 911 dispatcher. 
 
2. The Second Pratt Factor 
 
An informant is considered reliable when his or her report “is 
based on . . . personal observations.”50 Additionally, an informant is 
presumed to be telling the truth when he or she “is motivated by good 
citizenship and [is] willing to disclose the circumstances by which the 
incriminating information became known.”51 In Tye, the Court relied on 
its previous decision in City of Missoula v. Moore52 to find that the second 
Pratt factor was satisfied.53 However, Tye is factually distinguishable from 
Moore. In Moore, the informant’s tip was not fabricated. The defendant 
drove to a friend’s home, smelling of alcohol, and the friend called 911 to 
report the defendant.54 The friend reported that she observed the defendant 
get into her vehicle, and she provided dispatch with details such as the 
car’s make, model, and color, and the direction in which she was driving.55 
Additionally, the defendant’s husband, who personally observed the 
defendant’s driving, also called 911 to report her driving while intoxicated, 
and he provided his full name, phone number, and home address.56 In 
Moore, the Court determined that “an informant’s belief that a person is 
DUI must be based, in part, on his or her personal observations.”57  
The Court also cited Navarette v. California,58 a case in which the 
United States Supreme Court held that information from an anonymous 
911 caller was sufficiently reliable to establish particularized suspicion for 
investigative stops.59 The Naverette factors set forth by the Supreme Court 
“weighed in favor of finding the caller’s information reliable” if the caller 
claimed personal knowledge of the dangerous driving by providing 
specific information regarding the vehicle and driving behavior, the report 
was “substantially contemporaneous” with the caller’s personal 
                                           
48 Tye, 372 P.3d at 1290. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. (citing Pratt, 951 P.2d at 42–43). 
51 Moore, 251 P.3d at 684 (quoting State v. Martinez, 67 P.3d 207 (Mont. 2003)). 
52  251 P.3d 679 (Mont. 2011). 
53 Moore, 251 P.3d at 684. 
54 Id. at 681. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 684 (citing State v. Clawson, 212 P.3d 1056 (Mont. 2009)). 
58 Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014). 
59 Tye, 372 P.3d at 1290 (citing Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687–88).  
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observations, and the caller used the 911 system, which has certain 
safeguards in place if the report is determined later to be false.60 In Tye, 
the Court concluded that Navarette is consistent with Pratt and its progeny 
because its test for reliability looks to whether “the informant’s report is 
based on personal observations.”61 
Here, Haddad benefitted from the presumption that an informant 
is telling the truth at the time he made his report. However, Haddad was 
not truthful about how he knew what he knew. Haddad’s report that Tye 
was DUI was in part motivated by good citizenship, but the actual 
information he provided the 911 dispatcher was not derived from his 
personal observations, and it was motivated by Haddad’s personal 
interests in his friendship with Tye. This is distinguishable from both 
Moore and Navarette, where the informants’ reports contained 
information regarding their actual personal observations of the defendants. 
Furthermore, the Moore informants provided their full names, addresses, 
and telephone numbers.62 Here, Haddad declined to provide his address.63 
While Haddad did observe Tye before calling 911, Haddad fabricated not 
only his location and Tye’s location but also his personal observations of 
Tye’s impaired driving.64 Despite Haddad’s fabrications, the Court 
correctly recognized that the officers, unaware of the untruthfulness of the 
report, were not required to personally assess the reliability of Haddad’s 
report at the time of the stop.65 
In Moore, the Court also concluded that an officer may infer that 
a report is based on an informant’s personal observations “‘if the report 
contains sufficient detail that it is apparent that the informant has not been 
fabricating the report . . . and the report is of the sort which in common 
experience may be recognized as having been obtained in a reliable 
way.’”66 Haddad was able to report the approximate location, make, 
model, color, and “gold badging” of Tye’s vehicle, but he claimed he was 
unable to see the license plate or identify Tye’s specific physical features.67 
Nevertheless, the Court decided that the inconsistencies in Haddad’s 
report did not weigh against his reliability because “there was no 
indication that Haddad was fabricating the information in his report” at the 
time of the stop, and so the officers were correct to rely on his 
information.68 It is certainly plausible based on the level of detail in 
Haddad’s report that he personally observed Tye driving while 
intoxicated. The Court was correct in finding that, although Haddad’s was 
                                           
60 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689. 
61 Tye, 372 P.3d at 1291 (citing Moore, 251 P.3d at 684; Pratt, 951 P.2d at 42–43).  
62 Moore, 360 Mont. at 23. 
63 Tye, 372 P.3d at 1288. 
64 Id. at 1289. 
65 Pratt, 951 P.2d at 44. 
66 Moore, 251 P.3d at 684 (quoting Pratt, 951 P.2d at 42). 
67 Tye, 372 P.3d at 1288. 
68 Id. at 1291. 
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not entirely truthful, the officers appropriately presumed that his report 
was truthful because it was not apparent at the time of the stop that his 
personal observations were fabricated. 
 
3. The Third Pratt Factor 
 
In assessing the reliability of an informant’s tip, a court also 
considers whether an officer’s own observations “corroborate the 
informant’s information.”69 Under the third Pratt factor, an officer may 
“corroborate an informant’s report by observing illegal activity or by 
finding ‘the person, the vehicle, and the vehicle’s location substantially as 
described by the informant.’”70 If the first two Pratt factors are satisfied, 
an officer may corroborate an informant’s personal observations by 
“‘observing wholly innocent behavior.’”71  
In Tye, the officers were only able to rely upon the innocent details 
of Haddad’s report.72 Haddad provided the vehicle’s description, its 
approximate location, and its direction of travel.73 Because the first two 
Pratt factors were satisfied, the Court correctly found that this innocent 
information was sufficient for the officers to corroborate the entirety of 
Haddad’s report.74  
 
B.   Expanding the Scope of the Pratt Analysis 
 
Informant reliability has regularly been challenged in Montana, 
but the Court has consistently found that an informant is reliable when her 
report is actually based on her personal observations.75 Tye marks the first 
time the Court determined that an informant is reliable even though his 
report was based on fabricated personal observations. Because of Tye’s 
unique facts, the Court had to reconcile the requirements of particularized 
suspicion with a facially reliable informant whose report was later found 
to be fabricated. Tye’s holding has ultimately expanded the scope of Pratt 
and its progeny, and thus expanded the scope of particularized suspicion. 
Tye allows officers to develop particularized suspicion from a reasonable 
reliance on an informant’s fabricated report.  
                                           
69 Id. at 1290 (citing Pratt, 951 P.2d at 42–43). 
70 Id. at 1291 (citing Moore, 251 P.3d at 685 (quoting Pratt, 951 P.2d at 45)). 
71 Id. at 1291 (quoting Moore, 251 P.3d at 685). 
72 Id. at 1288. 
73 Id. at 1291–1292. 
74 Id. 
75 See e.g. Moore, 251 P.3d 679; Clawson, 212 P.3d at 1059 (holding that an informant was reliable 
when she adequately identified herself and her location and the information she provided was based 
upon her actual observations of the defendant); See also State v. Gill, 272 P.3d 60, 64-66 (Mont. 2012) 
(holding that an informant’s actual personal observations regarding the defendant’s vehicle hitting a 
concrete barrier provided sufficient justification for the officer’s stop); See also State v. Rutherford, 
208 P.3d 389 (Mont. 2009) (holding that an informant was reliable because she provided a detailed 
and specific report of the defendant’s impaired driving, which was based on her actual personal 
observations). 
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When the officers stopped Tye, they were permitted under Moore 
to reasonably infer that Haddad’s report was based on his personal 
observations because there was “objective information available to both 
[them] and the 911 dispatcher,” including an identified informant who had 
called 911 to “report that he was driving behind a drunk driver and 
provided a detailed description of the vehicle.”76 The Court determined 
that the detail in Haddad’s report, “the contemporaneity of his report with 
the event he allegedly was observing, and his use of the 911 system all 
weigh[ed] in favor of finding his information reliable.”77 
 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 
In Pratt, the Court recognized the frequency with which courts 
and law enforcement encounter issues involving reports from citizen 
informants, and it sought to provide guidance on the proper use of 
informant reports.78 Tye is certainly not the first case the Court has decided 
in which an informant’s reliability has been challenged. However, Tye is 
unique because, unlike previous cases such as Pratt and Moore, the Court 
found reliable an informant whose report was based on fabricated personal 
observations. While Haddad may have observed Tye prior to calling 911, 
no part of Haddad’s 911 report was based on his personal observations. 
However, at the time of the stop Haddad’s report appeared reliable. It was 
only after Tye’s arrest that officers found out Haddad was untruthful about 
his observations. While this fact may be troubling, the Court was 

















                                           
76 Tye, 372 P.3d at 1291. 
77 Id. 
78 Pratt, 951 P.2d at 42.  
